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Biomedical enhancement refers to the use of biomedical interventions to improve
capacities beyond normal, rather than to treat deficiencies due to diseases.
Enhancement can target physical or cognitive capacities, but also complex human
behaviors such as morality. However, the complexity of normal moral behavior makes
it unlikely that morality is a single capacity that can be deficient or enhanced. Instead,
our central hypothesis will be that moral behavior results from multiple, interacting
cognitive-affective networks in the brain. First, we will test this hypothesis by reviewing
evidence for modulation of moral behavior using non-invasive brain stimulation. Next,
we will discuss how this evidence affects ethical issues related to the use of moral
enhancement. We endwith the conclusion that while brain stimulation has the potential to
alter moral behavior, such alteration is unlikely to improve moral behavior in all situations,
and may even lead to less morally desirable behavior in some instances.
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INTRODUCTION
Biomedical enhancement refers to biomedical interventions used to improve certain capacities
beyond normal, rather than to restore capacities deficient as a result of a disease (Chatterjee, 2004).
Cognitive enhancement, for example, involves using biomedical interventions like drugs (Maher,
2008) or non-invasive brain stimulation (Wurzman et al., 2016) to improve an individual’s memory,
attention, executive functions, or other cognitive functions beyond normal. The use of cognitive
enhancement has increased, leading to intense ethical debates about whether such enhancement is
morally permissible (Chatterjee, 2004; Greely et al., 2008; Darby, 2010).
Moral enhancement refers to improving moral or social behavior, rather than cognition or
physical attributes (Harris and Savulescu, 2014). Morality, broadly defined, refers to evaluating
whether an action (or person performing an action) is good or bad (Haidt, 2001). The idea
to use biomedical interventions to improve moral behavior is not new. For example, Delgado,
an early pioneer in brain stimulation, argued that progress toward a “psycho-civilized society”
would require both educational and biomedical interventions to improve moral motivations and
reduce tendencies toward violence (Delgado, 1969). His concerns for unrestrained advances in
“technologies of destruction” (Delgado, 1969) without accompanying advances in moral behavior
parallel many modern ethicists (Persson and Savulescu, 2013). Interventions to treat violent or
immoral behavior were also advocated for by early supporters of psychosurgery (Mark, 1970).
Moral enhancement raises a number of unique ethical questions that are different than ethical
issues in the use of cognitive enhancement. For example, cognitive enhancement benefits the
individual but can be harmful to society in terms of distributive justice and fairness. However,
the opposite argument could be made for moral enhancement, which is more likely to benefit
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society but not necessarily the individual (Douglas, 2016).
Second, allowing cognitive enhancement is argued to maximize
an individual’s autonomy [although coercion to use cognitive
enhancement in order to “keep up” may limit autonomy (Darby,
2010)]. In contrast, critics of moral enhancement argue that
such interventions would significantly limit an individual’s
freedom, freedom that is intrinsically valuable even if that
choice is to behave immorally (Harris, 2011). Third, the “moral”
decision in many situations remains uncertain, and depends
on one’s philosophical, political, religious, or cultural beliefs.
Moral “enhancement” might therefore differ depending on one’s
ideology. Finally, while proponents of cognitive enhancement
argue that cognitive interventions should be morally permissible,
certain proponents of moral enhancement argue that moral
enhancement should be morally obligatory, or required (Persson
and Savulescu, 2013).
A critical point is that discussions about cognitive
enhancement often focus on improving cognitive capacities
as a means to improve cognition, while discussions in moral
enhancement have focused on the ultimate ends of moral
enhancement. However, by doing so, the practical means of how
altering specific cognitive-affective capacities can lead to changes
in moral behavior is neglected. Given the intense and conflicting
ethical opinions about moral enhancement, it is especially
important to consider whether morality can be enhanced,
and, if so, what the likely consequences of such modification
will be Douglas (2013). We will argue that morality does not
consist of a single neuropsychological capacity, but rather is a
group of neuropsychological capacities that guide normal social
behavior (Darby et al., 2016). This position is not new, and is
based on a growing body of evidence from moral psychology
(Cushman et al., 2006; Cushman and Young, 2011), functional
neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Young et al., 2007),
and the study of neurological patients with antisocial behaviors
(Moll et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007, 2012; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Mendez, 2009; Thomas et al., 2011; Fumagalli and Priori,
2012; Ibañez and Manes, 2012) demonstrating the complexity
and heterogeneity of the “moral” brain.
In this article, we review the existing literature on the use
of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) to modulate moral
behavior. Rather than improving or impairing a single “moral”
process, we will show that non-invasive brain stimulation alters
specific neuropsychological processes contributing to normal
moral behavior. Such alterations can be viewed as moral
“enhancement” in certain situations, but may lead to immoral
behavior in other situations. Finally, we will discuss how the
evidence from non-invasive brain stimulation affects the ethical
debate on moral enhancement.
METHODS
We searched Pubmed (from indexing through 1/2016) for all
articles involving non-invasive bran stimulation (using the terms
“transcranial magnetic stimulation” OR “transcranial direct
current stimulation” OR TMS OR tDCS OR “non-invasive brain
stimulation” OR “theta burst stimulation” OR TBS) and moral
behavior (using the terms moral OR morality OR altruism OR
cooperation OR fairness OR unfairness OR empathy OR social
OR aggression). We additionally searched references in review
articles for additional cases. This search resulted in 470 articles.
From these, 48 specifically involved the use of non-invasive brain
stimulation on morally relevant behaviors. We classified articles
based on themethodology (neurophysiological response tomoral
stimuli using NIBS vs. modulation of moral behavior using
NIBS), NIBS parameters (TMS vs. tDCS, stimulation, frequency,
duration, location, use of neuronavigation), psychological tests
used, and significant findings.
Modulation of Moral Judgments Using
Non-invasive Brain Stimulation
A small but growing number of studies have examined the role of
non-invasive brain stimulation in moral behavior and decision-
making in normal persons (Table 1). Repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) studies use low frequency rTMS
to create a “functional lesion” to test hypotheses regarding
whether specific brain regions are necessary for specific moral
judgments, while high frequency rTMS is thought depolarize or
activate cortex. Similarly, transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) studies examine both whether increasing (anodal) or
decreasing (cathodal) cortical excitability in a particular brain
region altered moral behavior. However, the actual physiological
effects of specific brain stimulation parameters remain unknown.
Therefore, it is most appropriate to state that a particular NIBS
protocol modulates moral behavior while remaining agnostic as
to whether this is due to increasing or decreasing brain activity in
a specific region vs. a more complex pattern of modulation. The
majority of studies focus exclusively on the role of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), although a smaller number have
investigated the role of the right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ)
and the medial frontal lobe. Finally, it should be noted that this
review is likely to under-report non-significant findings given
publishing biases toward positive results.
Modulation of Specific Moral Behaviors
One important and well-studied factor in moral behavior is the
aversion to violating the personal rights of other persons, such
as causing them physical harm. One method of experimentally
testing aversion to harming others has been to use personal and
impersonal moral dilemmas, where a subject must chose whether
to harm one person in order to save many others (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004). These dilemmas require choosing between
competing moral considerations: the personal rights of a single
person, and the aversion to causing direct harm to them, versus
the utilitarian benefit of saving a larger number of persons. One
Hertz rTMS over the right DLPFC increased utilitarian responses
to first-person, high conflict dilemmas specifically, suggesting
a diminished aversion to violating the rights of others (Tassy
et al., 2012). A potentially conflicting result was seen in a study
where three repetitive pulses administered to the right DLPFC
at critical time-points resulted in decreased utilitarian responses,
suggesting either a disruption in utilitarian considerations, or
an enhanced consideration of the personal rights of others
(Jeurissen et al., 2014). However, the time-specific protocol of
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TABLE 1 | Modulation of moral behavior using non-invasive brain stimulation.
Study Brain stimulation Localization Significant findings
MODULATION WITH tDCS
Sellaro et al., 2015b Anodal/Cathodal/Sham R. TPJ Anodal stimulation of R. TPJ led to diminished moral blame
for accidental harmsIntensity of 1 mA Target: CP6, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref. L. SO, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Sellaro et al., 2015a Anodal/Cathodal/Sham mPFC Anodal stimulation of mPFC reduced racial bias on IAT for
reaction time and errors (Cohen’s d = 0.99)Intensity of 1 mA Target: CPz, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref. Oz, 35 cm2
Testing during last 10 min
Kuehne et al., 2015 Anodal/Cathodal L. DLPFC Anodal stimulation of L. DLPFC led to LESS utilitarian
responses to hard personal dilemmasIntensity of 1 mA Target: F3, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref. P4, 35 cm2
Testing during last 10 min
Kelley et al., 2015 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham L. or R. DLPFC Anodal stimulation of L. DLPFC stimulation increased jealousy
ratings relative to right and sham after social exclusionIntensity of 2 mA Target: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Duration 15 min Ref: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Nihonsugi et al., 2015 Anodal/Sham R. DLPFC Anodal stimulation of R. DLPFC increases trust/cooperation
Intensity 2 mA Target: MNI (44, 34, 22), 35 cm2
Unknown Duration
Testing after 5 min Ref: Oz, 35 cm2
Dambacher et al., 2015b Anodal/Sham R. DLPFC Anodal stimulation of R. DLPFC reduced proactive
aggression in men only (Cohen’s d = 1.5)Intensity of 2 mA Target: F4, 35 cm2
Duration 12.5 min Ref: L. SO, 35 cm2
Testing during stimulation
Wang et al., 2014 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham L. DLPFC Anodal stimulation of L. DLPFC increased empathic pain
ratingsIntensity of 2 mA Target: F3, 35 cm2
Duration of 5 min Ref: FP4, 25 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Riva et al., 2015b Cathodal/Sham R. VLPFC, Cathodal stimulation to R. VLPFC increased negative feelings
associated with exclusion (Cohen’s d = 0.8)Intensity of 1.5 mA Duration of 20 min Target: F6, 25 cm2
Testing during last 15 min Ref: L. SO, 35 cm2
Riva et al., 2015a Anodal/Sham R. VLPFC, Anodal stimulation of R. VLPFC decreased aggression after
social exclusion (Cohen’s d = 0.62)Intensity of 1.5 mA Duration of 20 min Target: F6, 25 cm2
Testing during last 15 min Ref: L. SO, 35 cm2
Riva et al., 2012 Anodal/Sham R. VLPFC, Anodal stimulation of R. VLPFC decreased hurt feelings
(Cohen’s D = 1.04) and unpleasantness (Cohen’s d = 0.91)
after social exclusion
Intensity of 1.5 mA Duration of 20 min Target: F8, 25 cm2
Testing during last 15 min Ref: L. SO, 35 cm2
Ruff et al., 2013 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham Intensity
of 1mA
R. VLPFC 1. Anodal stimulation of R. VLPFC increases (+33.5%), while
cathodal decreases (–22%), giving in ultimatum game,
2. Opposite effect in the dictator game, where cathodal
stimulation increases giving, while anodal stimulation
decreases giving
Unknown Duration Target: MNI (52, 28, 14), 35 cm2
Testing during stimulation Ref. Cz, 35 cm2
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Study Brain stimulation Localization Significant findings
Mameli et al., 2010 Anodal/Sham Bilateral DLPFC Target: F3/F4, 32
cm2 each
Anodal stimulation to bilateral DLPFC decreased reaction
times to making lies about general knowledge
(Cohen’s d = 1.5)
Intensity of 2 mA
Duration of 15 min Ref. R. deltoid, 64 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Fumagalli et al., 2010 Anodal/Cathodal Bilateral mPFC Anodal stimulation of the bilateral mPFC increased, and
cathodal decreased, utilitarian judgments in females onlyIntensity of 2 mA Target: “above eyes,” 54 cm2
Duration 15min Ref. R. deltoid, 64 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Karim et al., 2010 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham Intensity
of 1mA
Anterior PFC Cathodal stimulation of R. DLPFC improved lying score,
reduced reaction time, and reduced guilt of lying
Duration of 18 min Target: FP2, 24 cm2
Testing after 3 min Ref: PO3, 24 cm2
Hortensius et al., 2012 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham
Intensity of 2mA
R. or L. DLPFC Anodal Stimulation of L. DLPFC/Cathodal stimulation of R.
DLPFC increased aggressive responses
Duration 15 min Target: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation Ref. F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Priori et al., 2008 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham Bilateral DLPFC Anodal stimulation of bilateral DLPFC prolonged reaction
times to lies (Cohen’s d = 2.57)Intensity of 1.5 mA Target: F3/F4, 32 cm2 each
Duration of 10 min Ref. Deltoid, 64 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Knoch et al., 2008 Cathodal/Sham R. DLPFC Cathodal stimulation of R. DLPFC increased acceptance of
unfair offers (+21.2%), without changing judgments of
fairness, in ultimatum game
Intensity of 1.5 mA Target: F4, 35 cm2
Duration of 10 min Ref. L. SO, 100 cm2
Testing after 3 min
Civai et al., 2015 Cathodal//Sham Bilateral mPFC Cathodal stimulation of mPFC increases rejection of unfair
offers in ultimatum game when playing for a third partyIntensity of 2 mA Target: MNI (–2, 58, 8), 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref: R. arm, 35 cm2
Testing after 2 min
Fecteau et al., 2013 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham R. and L. DLPFC Both stimulation conditions increased lie generation
compared with sham stimulationIntensity of 2 mA Target: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Boggio et al., 2009 Anodal/Sham L. DLPFC, M1, V1 L. DLPFC anodal stimulation reduced unpleasantness
(−5.8%) and emotional discomfort (−8.9%) to viewing pain in
others
Intensity of 2 mA Target: F3, C3, or Oz, 35 cm2
Duration of 5 min Ref: R. SO, 35 cm2
Testing during session
Rêgo et al., 2015 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham L. or R. DLPFC L. DLPFC cathodal/R. DLPFC anodal reduced emotional
valence and arousal ratings to viewing pain in othersIntensity of 2 mA Target: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Duration of 15 min Ref: F3 or F4, 35 cm2
Testing after 5 min
Dambacher et al., 2015a Anodal/Cathodal/Sham L. or R. DLPFC No effects of either stimulation paradigm on Taylor aggression
paradigmIntensity of 1.5 mA Target: F7 or F8, 35 cm2
Duration of 22 min Ref: F7 or F8, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Study Brain stimulation Localization Significant findings
Wang et al., 2016 Anodal/Sham R. Orbitofrontal Anodal stimulation to R. orbitofrontal cortex increased
trust/giving in trust game (+15%)Intensity of 2 mA Target: FP2, 9 cm2
Duration of 15 min Ref: F4, 9 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
Ye et al., 2015 Anodal/Cathodal/Sham R. or L. TPJ 1. Anodal L. TPJ/ cathodal R. TPJ reduced blame for
attempted but unsuccessful harms.
2. Anodal R. TPJ/ cathodal L. TPJ increased blame for
successful harms
Intensity of 2 mA Target: CP5 or CP6, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref: CP5 or CP6, 35 cm2
Testing after 15 min
Sowden et al., 2015 Anodal/Active Sham R. TPJ vs. Occipital Anodal R. TPJ improved detection of lying in others (6.8%)
Intensity of 1 mA Target: CP6 or Oz, 35 cm2
Duration of 20 min Ref: Vertex, 35 cm2
Testing post-stimulation
MODULATION WITH TMS
Jeurissen et al., 2014 3-pulses, 150 ms apart R. DLPFC, R. TPJ Target: Talaraich
(39, 47, 7) or (60, −40, 19)
1. 3-pulse inhibition at 2.5 s of the R. DLPFC DECREASED
utilitarian decisions to personal dilemmas.
2. 3-pulse inhibition at 2.5 s of R. TPJ DECREASED utilitarian
decisions to impersonal dilemmas
Intensity of 70% machine output
Stimulation 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3 s into
decision
Balconi and Canavesio,
2014
TMS 10 Hz vs. Sham Intensity of
120% RMT Duration of 1 s per trial for
total of 80 trials
L. DLPFC 10 Hz TMS of L. DLPFC increased decision to help in all
scenarios except neutralTarget: Talairach (–1, 45, 15)
Baumgartner et al., 2014 rTMS 1 Hz vs. Sham Intensity of
110% RMT Duration of 20 min,
Testing post-stimulation
L. TPJ or R. TPJ 1 Hz TMS of R. TPJ decreased punishment of outgroup
personsTarget: MNI (−45, −60, 21) or (57,
−60, 30)
Tassy et al., 2012 rTMS 1 Hz vs. Sham Intensity of 54%
stimulator output
R. DLPFC 1 Hz TMS of R. DLPFC decreased utilitarian responses to
high conflict personal moral dilemmas (OR 0.248)
Duration of 15 min Target: Talairach (45, 36, 24)
Testing post-stimulation
Young et al., 2010 1. rTMS 1 Hz vs. control Intensity of
70% machine output
R. TPJ 1. 1 Hz TMS of R. TPJ increased permissibility for attempted
but unsuccessful harms.
2. Temporary inhibition of R. TPJ increased permissibility for
attempted but unsuccessful harms
Duration of 25 min Target: MNI (60, −54, 34)
Testing post-stimulation Control stimulation 5 cm posterior to
this region2. TMS 10Hz vs. control Intensity of
60% machine output
Duration of 500 ms at beginning of
each judgment
Knoch et al., 2006 rTMS 1 Hz vs. Sham R. or L. DLPFC, Target: Talaraich
(±39, 37, 22)
1 Hz rTMS of R. DLPFC increased acceptance of unfair offers
in ultimatum game (+35.4%)Intensity of 54% machine output
Duration of 15 min
Testing post-stimulation
Buckholtz et al., 2015 rTMS 1 Hz vs. Sham Intensity of 30%
machine output
R. or L DLPFC, Target: Talairach
(±39, 37, 22)
1 Hz TMS of either R. or L. DLPFC reduced punishment for
responsible moral violators, without changing judgments of
blameworthiness, or responsibility (Cohen’s d = 3.93)Duration of 30 min
Testing post-stimulation
Perach-Barzilay et al.,
2013
cTBS (3-pulse 50 Hz, delivered at
rate of 5 Hz) vs sham, intensity 100%
aMT, duration 1 min, testing
post-stimulation
R or L. DLPFC R. DLPFC cTBS reduces both reactive and proactive
aggression (Cohen’s d = 1.62)
Target: 5 cm anterior to motor
hot-spot
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Study Brain stimulation Localization Significant findings
Strang et al., 2015 rTMS 1 Hz vs. Sham R. or L DLPFC, Target: Talairach
(±39, 37, 22)
1. 1 Hz rTMS to R. DLPFC reduced giving
in both dictator and ultimatum. 2. 1 Hz
rTMS to R. DLPFC reduced punishment
for low offers
Intensity of 110% RMT
Duration of 15min
Testing post-stimulation
this study in relation to the final moral judgment makes it
difficult to interpret the causal role the right DLPFC in either
of these processes. It may be that the right DLPFC instead
integrates both harm aversion and utilitarian consequences, so
that inhibition of a critical time-point would prevent the input of
the emotional salience of personal harms from reaching the right
DLPFC. This highlights the uncertainty of determining the actual
neurophysiologic effects of different types of brain stimulation.
Complicating matters further, anodal stimulation to the
left DLPFC led to decreased utilitarian responses (or an
increased sensitivity to moral harms) (Kuehne et al., 2015),
while in a different study, bilateral anodal stimulation of the
medial prefrontal cortex increased, while cathodal stimulation
decreased, utilitarian responses in females only (Fumagalli et al.,
2010). It therefore remains uncertain whether modulation in this
task is based on right vs. left hemisphere stimulation, medial vs.
lateral stimulation, or a combination of these factors. Moreover,
given that the task leads to competing moral considerations, it is
unclear which factor (harm aversion or utilitarian reasoning) is
being modified by brain stimulation.
Non-invasive brain stimulation can also influence altruism,
trust, cooperation, and other prosocial behaviors. One approach
to studying prosocial behavior uses economics games where one
person (player A) is given a sum of money and has the option
to give a portion of that money to another person (player B).
In the dictator game, there is no threat of retribution for unfair
offers, while in the ultimatum game, player B can reject an unfair
offer, in which case neither player will receive any money (in
a sense, paying to punish the unfair offer of player A). Anodal
tDCS to the right DLPFC led to lower offers without the threat
of punishment but higher offers with the threat of punishment,
while cathodal tDCS had the opposite effect (Ruff et al., 2013).
However, in a different study, 1 Hz rTMS to the same region
reduced giving in both the dictator and ultimatum games (Strang
et al., 2015). In another economic game, player A can choose
to “trust” player B by giving money to player B, which will be
tripled. Player B can then give back a portion of this investment
to player A (“cooperate”), or keep an even larger sum of money
and not give any money back to player B. Anodal stimulation of
the right DLPFC [or the right orbitofrontal cortex (Wang et al.,
2016)] increased decisions to trust (as player A) and cooperate
(as player B), indicating a general enhancement of prosocial
behavior (Nihonsugi et al., 2015). Similarly, 10 Hz rTMS to the
right DLPFC enhanced the willingness to intervene to help others
in simulated situations (Balconi and Canavesio, 2014). Cathodal
stimulation of the right DLPFC increased lying, a behavior where
one is being untrustworthy (Karim et al., 2010). These results
generally support the view that increasing activity in the right
DLPFC increases decisions to trust and cooperate, although
reduced giving in the dictator game in one study (Ruff et al., 2013)
suggests that this may not be due to pure altruism per se, but
instead may be due to an increased adherence to expected social
norms. Understanding the social expectations of other players
in these economic games can lead to the mutually beneficial
outcomes available through cooperation compared with selfish
playing.
A related issue is whether to punish others who are unfair
or violate other social norms. Both low frequency rTMS (Knoch
et al., 2006) and cathodal tDCS (Knoch et al., 2008) of the right
DLPFC increase a subjects willingness to accept unfair offers as
player B in the ultimatum game, suggesting that the perceived
unfairness of the offer (which remains unchanged by stimulation)
exerts less influence on decision-making. In other words,
participants are less willing to “pay” to punish those who give
unfair offers. In a model of determining blame and punishment
for those committing crimes, simulating the experience of jurors
in a criminal trial, 1 Hz rTMS to the right DLPFC reduced the
punishment, without affecting blameworthiness, of the criminals
(Buckholtz et al., 2015). In contrast, reducing right DLPFC
activity (by applying anodal tDCS to the left and cathodal to the
right DLPFC) increased punishment of others who were critical
to subjects (Hortensius et al., 2012). Retributive punishment after
being socially excluded in a virtual ball-sharing task is reduced
after anodal stimulation to the right DLPFC (Riva et al., 2015a),
as is proactive aggression without any provocation (Dambacher
et al., 2015b). These latter findings suggest that the right DLPFC
may play a more general role in tempering aggressive behaviors
toward others.
Finally, several studies have investigated modulation of the
right temporal-parietal junction (right TPJ), an area important
in mediating the effects of intentions and mental states on moral
judgments, a process referred to as theory of mind (Young
et al., 2007). Low frequency rTMS or cathodal tDCS to the right
TPJ reduces the effect of the agent’s negative belief on moral
blameworthiness for attempted but unsuccessful harms (e.g.,
attempted murder) (Young et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2015), while
anodal tDCS to this area resulted in either increased blame for
actual harms (Ye et al., 2015), or an increased consideration of an
agent’s innocent intentions in accidental harms (e.g., accidentally
shooting someone), reducing judgments of moral blame (Sellaro
et al., 2015b). These results are consistent with neuroimaging
literature showing that this area is particularly sensitive to the
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role of intentions in moral judgments (Young et al., 2007; Koster-
Hale et al., 2013). The right TPJ is also involved in biasing in-
group vs. out-group status, as inhibition of this region reduces
the increased punishment that normally occurs when out-group
members do not cooperate compared with in-group members
(Baumgartner et al., 2014). A review of how brain stimulation
to the right TPJ affects social behavior outside the domain of
morality can be found elsewhere (Donaldson et al., 2015; Mai
et al., 2016).
Neuroanatomical Specificity of Brain Stimulation on
Moral Behavior
Based on these studies, tentative proposals can be mad for the
regionally specific effects of brain stimulation on moral behavior.
Inhibition of the right DLPFC reduces the influence of
harm on decision-making, both when deciding to perform
a harmful action oneself, and when punishing harmful
or unfair behaviors in others. This reduces decisions to
punish or disapprove of potentially harmful personal
moral violations in others. However, it also increased the
likelihood of performing a harmful action oneself, such
as lying or reacting aggressively. In contrast, excitatory
brain stimulation to the right DLPFC reduced aggression
and increased adherence to social norms. Taken together,
these results suggest that the right DLPFC is important for
representing aversion to harm, leading individuals to avoid
harming others, but also to punish those who do cause
harm.
This role may not be specific to the right hemisphere, as
stimulation of the left DLPFC may also results in increased
cooperation and increased consideration of harm violations in
moral dilemmas.
Finally, the right TPJ presumably exerts a more fundamental
role in modulating the role of beliefs and intentions in
moral judgments. This may influence the degree to which
a harmful action is perceived as moral (e.g., intended)
vs. non-moral (e.g., an accident). It also more generally
shifts focus toward the viewpoint of other persons, leading
to improved lie detection, for example Sowden et al.
(2015).
Moral Enhancement and Non-invasive
Brain Stimulation
The previous section provides evidence to support our
hypothesis that non-invasive brain stimulation can modulate
certain cognitive-affective capacities involved in moral cognition.
In the following section, we will discuss how modulating
capacities contributing to moral behavior, rather than assuming
enhancement of a single moral capacity, alters key ethical
considerations in moral enhancement.
Autonomy
Autonomy refers to the capacity of a person to define
his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals (Dworkin,
1988). A key component of such autonomy is the ability to
critically reflect upon, and either accept or change, one’s beliefs
(Dworkin, 1988). Proponents of cognitive enhancement argue
that individuals should be allowed to use cognitive enhancement
if such use aligns with their values and beliefs (Darby, 2010).
A similar argument can be made for moral enhancement.
Moral enhancement allows for an individual to express his
or her autonomy by choosing to improve specific capacities
contributing to moral behavior. For example, brain stimulation
could potentially modulate one’s capacity for empathy, or
one’s predisposition toward reacting aggressively. However, as
discussed previously, such modulation is likely to affect only
certain moral behaviors, but not others. Moreover, altering
a capacity that decreases reactive aggression, which may be
desired, might also decrease one’s willingness to punish those
who act violently, which may not be desired. So, in order
for individuals to make autonomous decisions regarding moral
enhancement, it is critical to understand how altering a capacity
will alter moral behavior in ways that are either desirable or
undesirable.
Permissible vs. Obligatory Moral Enhancement
Certain proponents have argued that moral enhancement should
be required, or obligatory (Persson and Savulescu, 2013, 2014).
They argue that technological advances have created tools that
can cause human suffering on catastrophic levels, ranging from
climate instability to weapons of mass destruction, similar to
historical arguments in favor of moral enhancement (Delgado,
1969). Without increasing our moral capacities, it is argued that
humanity faces inevitable destruction. In order to prevent such
destruction, mandatory moral enhancement is required. Such
requirements clearly violate one’s autonomy, but the impending
moral catastrophe outweighs this loss of personal liberties.
Again, such an argument assumes that one intervention can
be used to enhance all moral decisions, without considering
the mechanism by which such enhancement must occur.
The evidence presented from non-invasive brain stimulation
instead shows that only specific cognitive-affective capacities
contributing to moral behavior are likely to be enhanced,
affecting some but not all behaviors, and not always in
the desired direction. For example, improving empathy may
lead to improved moral behavior toward one’s in-group, but
more harsh retaliation against those outside of one’s group.
Conversely, increasing cognitive processes contributing to
utilitarian reasoning to consider the interests of many groups
of persons might come at the expense of decreasing one’s
aversion to harming persons in general. Given this reality, it is
unlikely that moral biomedical enhancement will alter behavior
to the extent necessary to requiring individuals to use moral
enhancing technologies. Proponents ofmoral enhancement agree
that such technologies are unlikely in the near future but should
be possible eventually (Persson and Savulescu, 2013, 2014).
However, it is difficult to imagine how such a technology could
ever be developed given our current understanding of moral
psychology.
Freedom of Choice and Authenticity
Harris (2011, 2013) has argued that moral enhancement would
reduce an individual’s freedom of choice, even if that choice
is to act immorally. Invoking Milton’s Paradise Lost, he argues
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that part of what makes humanity worthwhile is the freedom
to fall from grace (Harris, 2011). Again, this implies that moral
enhancement would make it impossible to act immorally, while
the evidence from non-invasive brain stimulation suggests that
such universal improvement is unlikely. More likely, moral
enhancement will alter an individual’s tendencies to make certain
moral decisions but not others. Because the decision to enhance
would be free, doing so would improve an individual’s ability
to act in accordance with what they deem to be morally
appropriate. While preferences might shift, the choice would
remain free.
This argument is perhaps similar to the authenticity
debate in cognitive enhancement, where some have expressed
concern that enhancement would taint the authentic, or
true, self (Parens, 2005). One could similarly argue that
moral enhancement would lead to inauthentic person,
even if morally superior. This debate centers on whether
authenticity is considered an innate, static gift that should
be appreciated and unchanged, or an ultimate goal that one
must aspire toward Parens (2005). According to the latter
definition, neither cognitive nor moral enhancement threatens
authenticity.
Moral Plurality
Part of the difficulty in understanding moral enhancement
is that many moral challenges do not have clear solutions.
So while there is agreement that improving memory, multi-
tasking, and executive functions are indicators of cognitive
enhancement, it is not clear how moral enhancement is
supposed to affect our views on controversial topics like
abortion, distributed justice, or choosing between the welfare
of different groups of persons. A more reasonable goal
would be to enhance certain moral motivations that are
universally agreed upon, which research in non-invasive brain
stimulation has shown to be theoretically possible. However,
enhancing a single capacity is unlikely to lead to what
one would consider a superior moral decision in every
instance.
That being said, it is reasonable that enhancing certain
cognitive-affective processes would lead to improved
moral behavior on average (Douglas, 2016). Moreover,
those with relatively low baseline capacities for certain
moral motivations might show a significant benefit from
moral enhancement. By understanding the mechanism and
implications of moral enhancement using non-invasive
brain stimulation, a rational but ethical implementation is
possible.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, limited but growing evidence thus far suggests
that brain stimulation can modulate specific cognitive-
affective processes involved in moral behavior, making moral
enhancement possible. However, rather than improving
one single moral capacity, brain stimulation alters specific
neuropsychological processes contributing to moral behavior.
Enhancement of these processes can lead to morally enhanced
behavior in some situations, but less morally desirable behavior
in other circumstances. This influences the ethical debate
regarding moral enhancement, showing that technologies will
be unlikely to change moral behavior to the extent required
to make moral enhancement obligatory, or to raise concern
regarding our freedom to act immorally. However, the more
modest goal of improving our tendencies to act in accordance
with our moral motivations is likely possible, and may be
desirable for large numbers of people. Given the very real
threats of weapons of mass destruction and other technologies
noted by past and current scholars, there is a clear need to
research moral interventions in greater depth. Such research
is needed to determine the implications of enhancing certain
capacities contributing to moral behavior so that informed,
rational debates regarding the use of moral enhancement are
possible.
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